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LEARNING FROM ERROR IN AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
JAMES M. DOYLE* 
 While an operator error may be the proximate “cause” of the accident, the root 
causes were often present within the system for a long time.  The operator has, in a 
real sense, been “set up” to fail by poor design, faulty maintenance, or erroneous 
management decisions. 
  —Lucian L. Leape1 
 [V]irtually every system we will examine places “operator error” high on its list of 
causal factors—generally about 60 to 80 percent of accidents are attributed to this 
factor.  But if, as we shall see time and again, the operator is confronted by 
unexpected and usually mysterious interactions among failures, saying that he should 
have zigged instead of zagged is possible only after the fact.  Before the accident no 
one could know what was going on and what should have been done. 
  —Charles Perrow2 
 
Wrongful convictions and other criminal justice system errors can be 
seen as “organizational accidents” in which small mistakes (no one of 
which would suffice to cause the event) combine with each other and with 
latent defects in the criminal justice system to create disasters.  Employing 
this conception of error in a consistent routine of examination of wrongful 
convictions, near misses, and other errors can increase the impact of the 
lessons of error, mitigate the fragmentation of the criminal justice system, 
and lay the foundation, as it has in medicine and aviation, for the creation 
of a “culture of safety.” 
 
* Consulting Director, Center for Modern Forensic Practice, John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, City University of New York; Of Counsel, Carney & Bassil, Boston, 
Massachusetts.  B.A. Trinity College; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law; LL.M. 
Georgetown University Law Center.  Contact: jdoyle@jjay.cuny.edu. 
1 Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1854 (1994). 
2 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 9 (1984). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
American criminal justice practitioners seem increasingly ready to face 
their errors and learn from them.  Are they edging toward a new 
orientation?  Is there potential for a cultural change?  Could criminal justice 
practitioners adopt some version of the quality reform initiatives that have 
reshaped other high-risk fields such as aviation and medicine?  Can the 
criminal justice system embrace “a theory of work, which conceptualize[s] 
the continual improvement of quality as intrinsic to the work itself”?3  Is it 
possible that the current era, defined by episodic patches motivated by high-
profile tragedies, will be replaced by a new period, dedicated to the 
sustained practice of learning from error? 
Take, as a starting point, the U.S. Department of Justice’s landmark 
1998 study of the first twenty-eight wrongful convictions exposed by DNA 
testing, Convicted By Juries, Exonerated By Science.4  Among criminal 
justice practitioners and policy-makers, this “Green Book” quickly became 
the most talked-about publication of the year.  Every veteran practitioner 
had made or seen mistakes.  Still, for most, this recognition of fallibility 
was a nagging ache that they learned to live with, not a sharp pain that 
provoked them to action.  Suddenly, practitioners confronted concrete, 
specific, and irrefutable proof of tragic errors. 
The errors identified in the Green Book came from the sort of bread-
and-butter cases that everyone had handled and would handle again, not 
from arcane borderland specialties.  Innocent men who were convicted by 
the testimony of sincere eyewitnesses, our oldest form of evidence, 
dominated the list of exonerated prisoners.  Twenty-four of the twenty-eight 
cases involved misidentifications.  By the time Barry Scheck, Peter 
Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer published Actual Innocence in 2000, the roster was 
up to 53 innocent defendants imprisoned for an aggregate 197 years by 77 
mistaken eyewitnesses.5  Eight of the exonerated had been sentenced to 
death.  Fifty-three actual rapists and murderers had been left free to find 
additional victims.6  The current exoneration count stands at over two 
 
3 CHARLES KENNEY, THE BEST PRACTICE: HOW THE NEW QUALITY MOVEMENT IS 
TRANSFORMING MEDICINE 30 (2008). 
4 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUST., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER 
TRIAL (1996).  The “Green Book” is certainly only a starting place.  A genuinely heroic body 
of scholarship has marshaled and categorized the exoneration cases.  See Brandon L. Garrett, 
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in 
the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).. 
5 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 264 (2000). 
6 Id. 
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hundred; eyewitness misidentification cases still provide the largest element 
of the list.7 
There were efforts to dismiss the Green Book and later Innocence 
Project compilations as catalogues of freakish mishaps: at best noise in the 
data; at worst, bleeding-heart propaganda.  This argument (made by Justice 
Scalia, among others)8 gained very little traction with the public, in part 
because every time it was put forward, the Innocence Project exposed 
another horrifying wrongful conviction. 
The criminal justice system’s front-line practitioners—the people who 
actually do the work on the streets and in the courts—showed little interest 
in the comfort that the system’s apologists tried to offer them.  The criminal 
practitioners were drowning in heavy caseloads, so they knew that even 
very low rates of error would still result in a very high absolute number of 
tragedies.  More importantly, practitioners felt that the rarefied utilitarian 
calculations that absorbed Justice Scalia were beside the point.  For 
practitioners, avoiding errors was a matter of professionalism, 
workmanship, and, ultimately, self-respect; it was not a matter of social 
policy.9  The front-line troops accepted the Green Book as a call to action: 
one error was too many.  Dozens of jurisdictions, acting independently of 
one another, mobilized efforts to address the problems identified in the 
Green Book. 
The initial leadership came from different players in different places.  
Attorney General Janet Reno, who decided that the Green Book would 
include commentary from the full spectrum of criminal justice system 
actors, provided an influential template.  Under the auspices of the National 
Institute of Justice, she convened mixed “Technical Working Groups,” 
which brought together diverse stakeholders to hammer out and publicize 
new criminal justice “best practices.”  These groups addressed crime scene 
investigations, death investigations, and eyewitness evidence, among other 
 
7 Garrett, supra note 4, at 78-80. 
8 See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006) (“Like other human institutions, courts 
and juries are not perfect.  One cannot have a system of criminal punishment without 
accepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly.  That is a truism, not a 
revelation.  But with regard to the punishment of death in the current American system, that 
possibility has been reduced to an insignificant minimum.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).  See 
generally Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501 
(2005) (arguing that incidence of wrongful convictions is overstated in advocates’ public 
accounts). 
9 Kenneth Patenaude, Improving Eyewitness Identifications, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECH., 
Oct. 2008, at 178 (explaining the importance of heeding exoneration lessons). 
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topics.10  Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck, the co-founders of the Innocence 
Project, who had been among Reno’s Green Book commentators, called for 
a learning-from-error initiative.11  In North Carolina, the first impetus came 
from the conservative Republican chief justice of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court.12  In Boston, it came from the elected district attorney;13 in 
Illinois, from Northwestern University’s Center on Wrongful Convictions 
and the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment;14 and in New 
Jersey, from a Republican attorney general.15  Every time judges, cops, 
prosecutors, or Innocence Network lawyers took steps forward, they found 
allies from all points of the criminal justice system, often among their 
courtroom adversaries. 
The success of these novel and diverse groups often took their 
participants by surprise—their members were not accustomed to working 
together.  But it has turned out that no one became a police officer or lawyer 
to participate in putting the innocent in prison so that the guilty could 
remain free.  Battle-scarred detectives and unfledged public defenders had 
something in common: they took the phrase “good enough for government 
work” as an insult and a goad when it was applied to their own professional 
lives.16 
 
10 NAT’L INST. JUST., CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
(2000); NAT’L INST. JUST., EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999); 
NAT’L INST. JUST., DEATH INVESTIGATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE SCENE INVESTIGATOR (1999). 
11 Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence 
Commissions” in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 99 (2002). 
12 Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon 
Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 648-49 (2004); Matthew 
Eiseley, Better ID Sought in Criminal Inquiries, NEWS & OBSERVER (Charlotte, N.C.), Sept. 
13, 2003, at B1.  The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission also serves as a 
remedial vehicle.  See Jerome M. Maiatico, Note, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of 
the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1356 (2007). 
13 Daniel F. Conley, Our Duty to Free the Wrongly Convicted, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 
2004, at A14.  See generally Garrett, supra note 4, at 56; Press Release, Report of the Task 
Force on Eyewitness Evidence to Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney, Suffolk County, and 
Kathleen M. O’Toole, Commissioner, Boston Police Department (July, 2004), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Suffolk_eyewitness.pdf. 
14 STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
(2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/ 
summary_recommendations.pdf.  See generally SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT 
(2003) (reviewing lessons of service on Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital 
Punishment). 
15 Letter from John J. Farmer, Jr., New Jersey Attorney-General, to Various Recipients, 
Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup 
Identification Procedures (Apr. 18, 2001). 
16 Patenaude, supra note 9; see also JAMES DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, 
SCIENCE AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION 169-87 (discussing participant’s 
account of Technical Working Group discussions). 
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The post-exoneration landscape began to be marked by examples of 
tentative cooperation.  To call this development a movement17 captures 
some of its momentum, but the term obscures the fact that these initiatives 
arose organically from largely uncoordinated local efforts.  They were 
spurred by local law enforcement, the local bar, or the local judiciary, often 
in response to local journalists’ coverage of exonerations.18  By now, these 
scattered alliances have produced a substantial body of achievements 
affecting the way crimes are investigated and adjudicated.  Legislation, 
collections of best practices, binding administrative guidelines, non-binding 
guides, and enhanced training programs have been created or are underway 
on national, state, and local levels.  They can be expected to multiply. 
The purpose of this Article is not to catalogue these efforts or to 
consider their merits; it is to examine them as precursors and to ask toward 
what goal these first steps could lead.  In examining that question, this 
Article will mobilize the experiences of medicine and aviation in blazing 
their own trails toward a culture of safety to illuminate what may develop 
from the criminal justice system’s efforts to learn from error.  By 
recognizing some of the self-imposed limits of the current approach, we can 
reveal the potential for broader and deeper change. 
II.  THE WRONG MAN: EYEWITNESS “SYSTEM VARIABLES” 
The effort to integrate the science of perception and memory into 
eyewitness evidence collection (in interviews, photo arrays, and lineups) is 
the reform initiative that has moved forward most rapidly and in the 
greatest number of jurisdictions in the aftermath of the Green Book’s initial 
shock.  From a distance, the implementation of new eyewitness procedures 
presents a simple story.  By an accident of history (this version goes), when 
the Green Book’s DNA exoneration catalogue was released, there was a 
body of psychological science on eyewitness performance ready to be taken 
down from its shelf and immediately employed.  In fact, the history of the 
eyewitness reforms is both more complex and more instructive.  It shows 
that psychologists were capable of making important science-based 
recommendations and that members of the criminal justice system were 
willing to embrace the recommendations. 
 
17 Garrett, supra note 4, at 57-58.  An important element of the wave of reform, the 
electronic recording of interrogations, is described in Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic 
Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1127 (2005). 
18 See, e.g., JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008) (providing a narrative 
of the development of state innocence commission). 
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Legal skepticism about eyewitness reliability is immemorial and, at 
least since the publication over one hundred years ago of Hugo 
Münsterberg’s On the Witness Stand,19 has been reinforced by 
psychological findings about the process of human perception, memory 
storage, and recall.  Until the early 1970s, practitioners in the fields of law 
and psychology pursued their concerns about eyewitness reliability along 
parallel paths.  In Warren Court identification decisions such as Wade, 
Stovall, and Neil, the legal system focused on suggestive police misconduct 
as the source of eyewitness error.20  Psychologists continued to pursue 
research following the general lines that Münsterberg and his 
contemporaries had laid down: they rejected the model of a simple, 
photographic, and permanent memory capacity in humans, and explored 
memory’s complexities and frailties. 
But in the early 1970s the two fields were steered into a collision by 
Robert Buckhout, a psychology professor at Brooklyn College and 
dedicated provocateur.  Buckhout demanded a place for eyewitness 
psychology in the courts.  He staged demonstrations of eyewitness 
unreliability.  For example, he created a televised crime and lineup that 
placed viewers in the role of eyewitness.21  The viewers called in with their 
picks for the perpetrator, and the results showed fewer correct answers than 
random guessing would have achieved.22  More importantly, Buckhout 
testified in court.23  His expert testimony in the Angela Davis murder trial (a 
media circus of its era) was widely regarded as having led to Davis’s 
acquittal in the face of what had seemed to be an overwhelming prosecution 
case.24  Buckhout reopened the issue when he built on that success with a 
survey article in Scientific American25 and began an energetic campaign of 
encouraging defense lawyers to raise psychological findings in their 
eyewitness cases.  Buckhout had created a market for eyewitness 
psychology among desperate defense lawyers, and they clamored for more.  
 
19 HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 
(1908). 
20 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).  See generally Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, 
The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 
1079 (1973) (collecting then extant psychological studies on eyewitness performance). 
21 Robert Buckhout, Nearly 2,000 Witnesses Can Be Wrong, 16 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC 
SOC’Y 307 (1980).  On Buckhout and his era and the history of the law/psychology 
interactions generally, see DOYLE, supra note 16. 
22 Id. 
23 Buckhout, supra note 22. 
24 MARY TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN: THE STORY OF THE TRIAL OF ANGELA DAVIS 220-21 
(1976). 
25 Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 SCI. AM. 23 (1974). 
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It seemed to many—and especially to the prosecutors Buckhout gleefully 
taunted—that if Buckhout was given his way he would eliminate 
eyewitness evidence altogether. 
At this point Elizabeth Loftus entered the scene.26  Where Buckhout 
had staged dramatic, media-friendly demonstrations, Loftus devised 
imaginative and technically scrupulous laboratory experiments.  Her inquiry 
into the malleability of memory had a number of far-reaching impacts.  
First, by applying rigorous scientific procedure to the eyewitness inquiry, 
she won entry for the topic into the most prestigious peer-reviewed 
journals.  Young research psychologists saw how the era’s idealistic urge to 
be socially relevant—the desire to “give psychology away”27—could be 
combined with an academic career; the volume of published research into 
eyewitness questions exploded.28  But beyond that, Loftus’s experiments 
showed that memory evidence was “trace evidence.”  Like blood or semen 
found at a crime scene, memory evidence was difficult to recover, easy to 
contaminate, and, even worse, once exposed to contamination, impossible 
to take back into a laboratory to test for whether the contaminates had taken 
effect. 
Lawyers and psychologists settled into a dialogue tightly focused on 
the issue of whether Loftus and her colleagues should be permitted to 
testify as expert witnesses in court.  This dialogue often resembled an 
exchange of mortar fire between opposing trenches.  One or two appellate 
courts required the admission of the testimony,29 others ordered its 
exclusion, but most required trial judges to exercise their discretion in 
deciding to admit or exclude expert testimony on the vulnerabilities of 
eyewitness memory.30  Everyone settled in to grind out the argument in 
case-by-case adversarial combat. 
 
26 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE 
EYEWITNESS AND THE EXPERT WHO PUT MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991); see also DOYLE, supra 
note 16, at 83-100. 
27 George A. Miller, Psychology as a Means of Promoting Human Welfare, 24 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1063, 1071 (1969). 
28 BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, 
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 67-70 (1995). 
29 See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006).  A gargantuan body 
of law review commentary—beginning with Fredric D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive 
You?  Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 
STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977), and continuing through Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that 
Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identification, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 
STETSON L. REV. 727 (2007), and beyond—addresses the expert witness issue. 
116 JAMES M. DOYLE [Vol. 100 
The deck was reshuffled by Gary Wells.  Wells argued that Buckhout, 
Loftus, and the psychologists who had followed their banner into courtroom 
battles had chosen the wrong point of entry.31  To begin with, Wells noted 
that the results of the Loftus experiments were statistical: they could tell 
you what happened eight times out of ten, but they could not tell you 
whether this case was one of the eight.  Besides, when it came to courtroom 
relevance, Loftus was a prisoner of her own scientific scrupulousness.  Her 
meticulous studies required that she isolate and manipulate one factor 
(stress, post-event information, duration, darkness, race) in an eyewitness 
encounter while controlling all others.  But actual crime events were 
composed of hundreds of factors.  Science had no mechanism for 
aggregating these separate factors and accounting for potential interactions.  
Even if one artificially limited an event to twenty factors with either high or 
low influence, there were over a million potential outcomes.  Experimental 
psychological findings—especially the best and most careful of them—
make very clumsy tools for use in courtroom attempts to catch eyewitness 
errors in specific cases after they have been made. 
Wells suggested that psychologists should work to prevent errors (or at 
least reduce the error rate) rather than claim the ability to diagnose errors 
from the witness stand.32  Moreover, he argued that psychologists should 
acknowledge that many experimental variables were not improvable in real 
crime environments.  Factors like lighting, duration, race, age, or presence 
of a weapon, which Wells christened “estimator variables,” were the wrong 
things—or at least not the first things—to address.33 
Wells contended that the initial emphasis should be placed on choices 
that were under the control of criminal justice system practitioners—factors 
which he christened “system variables.”34  How did police question 
eyewitnesses?  How were fillers picked for lineups?  Who ran the lineups?  
What instructions were witnesses given at a lineup?  What were the impacts 
of these decisions on reliability?  If we knew the answers to those 
questions, we could shape investigative practice accordingly. 
The answers that Wells and his colleagues developed over the 
following decade led them to propose concrete modifications to police 
procedure.  Four of these changes were recommended in a White Paper of 
the American Psychology-Law Society: choose lineup fillers to match the 
verbal description of the perpetrator (not the suspect); instruct witnesses 
viewing a lineup that the perpetrator may or may not be present; have the 
 
31 Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables and 
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1546 (1978). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1548. 
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lineup or photo array conducted by a “blind” administrator who does not 
know which lineup member is the suspect; and immediately record the 
witness’s statement of confidence in any choice the witness has made.35  
When these four recommendations were supplemented by a fifth—show the 
lineup members one at a time (sequentially) rather than in the traditional 
line (simultaneously)36—the new “double-blind, sequential” lineup protocol 
was created.  Laboratory results indicated that the new double-blind, 
sequential technique would—by eliminating unconscious police influence 
and muting the witnesses’ natural tendency to resort to a relative judgment 
choice of “looks-most-like” innocents from arrays and lineups that did not 
include the actual perpetrator—produce results twice as reliable as the 
traditional simultaneous method.37 
By the end of the 1990s, scattered jurisdictions wracked by eyewitness 
exonerations moved to adopt versions of Wells’s system-variable program 
and employed double-blind, sequential identification techniques.  First, 
New Jersey’s attorney general ordered statewide adoption of the reforms.38  
The National Institute of Justice published the Guide for Law Enforcement, 
which recommended best practices.  The Suffolk County (greater Boston 
area) District Attorney convened an eyewitness task force,39 and then he 
followed New Jersey’s lead and instituted double-blind, sequential 
procedures.  The Hennepin County (Minneapolis) State’s Attorney40 and the 
Wisconsin Attorney General41 did the same. 
Science—by means of DNA exonerations—confronted the criminal 
justice system with errors; the criminal justice system responded by 
applying the lessons of psychological science.  In a variety of jurisdictions 
 
35 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for 
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 627-35 (1998). 
36 Of the elements of the reformers’ program, the superiority of the “sequential” 
technique is the most contested.  See generally Roy S. Malpass, A Policy Evaluation of 
Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 12 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 394 (2006).  But see, e.g., 
Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup 
Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459 (2001).  For a 
study indicating that the “sequential” technique is superior for some lineups but not for 
others, see Michael R. Leippe, Donna Eisenstadt & Shannon M. Rauch, Cueing Confidence 
in Eyewitness Identifications: Influence of Biased Lineup Instructions and Pre-Identification 
Memory Feedback Under Varying Lineup Conditions, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 194 (2009). 
37 Steblay et al., supra note 36.  
38 DOYLE, supra note 16, at 189-97. 
39 Press Release, supra note 13. 
40 Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind 
Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006). 
41 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005), available at 
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/eyewitnesspublic1.pdf. 
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and contexts, the criminal justice system gathered its divergent 
practitioners—prosecutors, judges, defenders, scientists, and police—and 
they cooperatively addressed its policies and practices.  Longstanding 
traditional lineup routines were abandoned in favor of the science-based 
reforms.  It proved that it is not inevitable that when confronted with errors, 
the system’s practitioners will simply shrug and hope things get better on 
their own. 
Still, was all of this anything more than patching holes in the blacktop? 
III.  THE WRONG MAN MEETS THE WRONG PATIENT 
Elements of the eyewitness reforms could prove to be harbingers of 
something considerably more interesting than isolated fixes to specific 
problems: they reveal the potential for a shift from the retrospective, 
adversary inspection model of quality control toward an ideal of continuous 
quality improvement.  The eyewitness reforms provide an opportunity to 
exploit the experience of aviation and medicine—two other high-risk 
enterprises in which even a low rate of error can result in catastrophic 
costs—in trying to improve criminal justice system quality. 
Gary Wells’s decision to focus on prevention of eyewitness error 
instead of its retrospective diagnosis was more than a natural adaptation to 
the limitations of psychological science.  This commonsense adjustment 
conceals a potential paradigm shift: jurisdictions that adopted double-blind, 
sequential lineups overcame the legal system’s deep cultural tradition of 
treating errors as the work of “bad apples.” 
The endemic assumption in the criminal justice system, as in medicine, 
had always been “good man, good result.”42  As Dr. Lucian Leape wrote in 
his seminal 1994 essay, Error in Medicine: 
Physicians are expected to function without error, an expectation that physicians 
translate into the need to be infallible.  One result is that physicians, not unlike test 
pilots, come to view error as a failure of character—you weren’t careful enough, you 
didn’t try hard enough.  This kind of thinking lies behind a common reaction by 
physicians: “How can there be an error without negligence?”43 
In criminal justice culture, “[h]omicide detective,” or “prosecutor,” or 
“defender,” or “judge” substitutes effortlessly for “physician” in Leape’s 
analysis.  In this conception, any error (or at least any error that couldn’t be 
disposed of comfortably with “shit happens”) is an operator error: some 
surgeon, or cop, or nurse, or forensic scientist, or lawyer at the site of the 
event was lazy, or ill-trained, or venal, or careless. 
 
42 Donald Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Healthcare, 320 NEW ENGL. 
J. MED. 53, 53-55 (1989). 
43 Leape, supra note 1, at 1851. 
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The legal system traditionally blamed eyewitness unreliability on the 
misconduct of bad apple police officers who might be “rigging” lineups.  
The Warren Court’s misconduct-oriented opinions were a manifestation of 
this approach to quality control.  The criminal system maintains an 
elaborate, retrospective, adversarial inspection of criminal investigations.  
Inspection proceeds through grand jury indictment, pretrial discovery, 
suppression motions, cross-examination, argument, and instruction, all of 
which are conducted with an error-averse presumption of innocence and 
reasonable doubt standard as backups at the terminal adversary trial phase 
of the process.  Some people see this criminal process as an obstacle course 
pointlessly frustrating prosecutors, others as a conveyor belt mindlessly 
“processing” defendants,44 but everyone in the system agrees that mistakes 
come from bad apples and that litigation at the end of this process is well-
designed to find them. 
The Green Book did list a number of cases that conformed to the bad 
apple model.  For example, it described the exploits of the rogue forensic 
scientist, Fred Zain, who fabricated numerous laboratory tests and invented 
fictitious results.45  Better inspection in labs and courtrooms seemed to be 
an obvious strategy for frustrating the world’s Fred Zains.46  But the Green 
Book’s eyewitness exonerations presented cases in which bad apples had 
played no role.  The eyewitness exonerations typically were villainless 
tragedies in which the witnesses were sincere, and the cops went “by the 
book” (as the book then stood) and usually were encouraged by some form 
of apparent corroboration. 
The system-variable eyewitness reforms were revolutionary because 
they uncoupled quality improvement from retrospective inspection.  They 
linked quality to science-based improvements to practice early in the 
investigative process, upstream from the ultimate inspection stage error. 
As it turned out, the absence of villains from the eyewitness 
exoneration cases opened a shortcut that medical reformers had already 
struggled to find.47  Dr. Donald Berwick, a pioneer in the medical quality 
movement, slaved for years to develop a system for measuring various 
 
44 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 159-65 (1968).  See 
generally Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201 (2005) (suggesting the 
potential application of “systems theory” in its most general form to criminal justice and 
exonerations). 
45 CONNORS ET AL., supra note 4, at 18. 
46 See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 412-16 
(2007); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to 
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172-74 (2007). 
47 See generally KENNEY, supra note 3, at 15-47 (recounting the early history of medical 
quality movement). 
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aspects of health care performance.  He was convinced that one had to 
measure doctors’ performance before one could improve any aspect of 
practice.48  That basic task, he pointed out, was not being carried out.  
Berwick began to compile comprehensive statistics (on, for example, 
waiting times and medication errors), and he then tried to persuade the 
physicians at the Harvard Community Health Plan to pay attention to the 
inconsistencies that his numbers revealed.49  When Berwick proudly 
exposed his statistical treasures at his first meeting with the doctors he 
proposed to help, an enraged doctor crumpled Berwick’s report, threw it in 
Berwick’s face, and then stalked from the room.50 
After versions of this experience had been repeated a few times, 
Berwick realized that any program of measurement was inextricably 
associated in the doctors’ minds with a system of surveillance and post hoc 
inspection, which had blaming as its sole purpose and public ignominy as  
its only outcome.  Measurement of performance in medicine was so 
inconsistent because no one saw it as personally advantageous to be 
measured: having your performance measured could only land you in a 
world of pain. 
It was clear to Berwick that the exposure of imperfections would be a 
source of personal pain for the objects of his studies.51  This suffering was 
bad enough when it involved only distended waiting times for radiological 
procedures, but it was immeasurably worse when it revealed mistakes that 
harmed patients.  The catastrophic impact of the tort system was obvious.  
But beyond that, the problem was made more acute by the fact that, from 
their first days in medical or nursing school, everyone in medicine had been 
indoctrinated with a code combining total individual responsibility for 
patients and perfectionism in performance.  The in-house tradition of 
morbidity and mortality (M & M) reviews of surgical accidents might as 
well have been designed to reinforce a determination to treat every error as 
an operator error and every operator error as evidence of moral or 
professional failing in the operator.52  In theory, M & M presentations were 
an opportunity to learn from mistakes; in fact, they were experienced as a 
dreaded ceremonial warning that perfection was the requirement and that 




50 Id. at 17. 
51 Berwick, supra note 42, at 53. 
52 ATUL GAWANDE, When Doctors Make Mistakes (1999), reprinted in COMPLICATIONS: 
A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 47 (2002). 
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The result of this preoccupation with perfectionism was a “cycle of 
fear”54 in which medical professionals ignored or suppressed accounts of 
errors, thereby undermining efforts to prevent such errors in the future.  
Presumably practitioners directly involved with an error were scarred by the 
experience and took its lessons with them, but the lessons were not shared.  
Everyone agrees that, in the early days of the medical reform campaign, 
errors were dramatically under-reported.55 
But the reformers quickly recognized errors as a powerful lever.  They 
knew that although doctors saw things through the lens of the individual 
physician-patient encounter, and while hospital administrators and risk 
managers saw things through the statistical lens of the survival of a large 
functioning enterprise, everyone hated error and its costs.56  Berwick and his 
allies made the phrase “[e]very defect is a treasure” their battle-cry.57  The 
National Institute of Medicine published a landmark volume, To Err is 
Human: Building a Safer Health Care System, that hammered on the 
themes that the study of errors was useful and that the cultural and 
institutional barriers to studying errors should be attacked.58  
Berwick and his colleagues believed that one of the things driven 
underground by medicine’s otherwise admirable ideology of perfectionism 
and personal responsibility was the crucial fact that most errors were 
committed by capable people operating within systems that did not account 
for human imperfections.59  Dr. Lucien Leape noted that although 
“[m]ortality and morbidity conferences, incident reports, risk management 
activities, and quality assurance committees abound” in hospitals, they all 
focused on incidents and individuals.60  As Leape saw it, “[r]oot causes in 
the underlying systems were not sought.  No one assumed—as an aviation 
engineer would have—that errors and failures are inevitable and tried to 
design systems to prevent or absorb them.”61  Leape explained: “While the 
 
54 WILLIAM W. SCHERKENBACH, THE DEMING ROUTE TO QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY: 
ROAD MAPS AND ROADBLOCKS (1986). 
55 TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. 
Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., National Academy Press 2000) [hereinafter TO ERR IS 
HUMAN]; R. Lawton & D. Parker, Barriers to Incident Reporting in a Healthcare System, 11 
QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 15 (2002).  Critics of the criminal justice system similarly 
argue that the known wrongful conviction cases represent merely the tip of a much larger 
iceberg.  See generally SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5.  Its defenders argue that something 
close to perfection has been attained.  See generally Marquis, supra note 8. 
56 KENNEY, supra note 3, at 71. 
57 Berwick, supra note 42, at 54. 
58 TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 55. 
59 Id. 
60 Leape, supra note 1, at 1855.  
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proximal error leading to an accident is, in fact, usually a ‘human error,’ the 
causes of that error are often well beyond the individual’s control.  All 
humans err frequently.  Systems that rely on error-free performance are 
doomed to fail.”62  Of course, it is an inspiring thing when a surgeon takes 
responsibility for anything that happened to his patient during an operation, 
but in fact the surgeon had no real power over the lab error or medication 
mix-up that later took effect in the operating room.  This insight cleared the 
way for the reformers to explore the error-elimination practices of aviation 
and other high risk enterprises and compare them with the practices of 
medicine.  Leape pointed to the contrasts between a National Transportation 
Safety Board post-accident review and prevailing health care practice: 
For example, if a nurse gives a medication to the wrong patient, a typical response 
would be exhortation or training in double-checking the identity of both patient and 
drug before administration.  Although it might be noted that the nurse was distracted 
because of an unusually large case load, it is unlikely that serious attention would be 
given to evaluating overall work assignments or to determining if large case loads 
have contributed to other kinds of errors.  It is even less likely that questions would be 
raised about the wisdom of a system for dispensing medications in which safety is 
contingent on inspection by an individual at the end point of use.  Reliance on 
inspection as a mechanism of quality control was discredited long ago in industry . . . .  
More imaginative solutions could easily be found—if it were recognized that both 
systems and individuals contribute to the problem.63 
Guided by this perception, Leape, Berwick, and their colleagues now 
harnessed the growing literature on the psychology of accidents and human 
error developed in aviation and industrial investigations in their crusade for 
health care quality reform. 
Writers such as James Reason,64 Charles Perrow,65 and Diane 
Vaughan66 derived lessons from the tragic misadventures of humans 
interacting with advanced technologies.  Medical quality pioneers applied 
these lessons to health care environments where—as in criminal justice—
the mix of human beings and complex technologies was dominated by the 
impact of human performance, not by the reliability of technological 
innovations.  That body of knowledge and experience now offers a new 
direction for criminal justice if practitioners and policy-makers succeed in 
mobilizing it in the criminal system. 
The medical quality movement’s human error approach to generating 
the narrative of a case-gone-wrong provides an illuminating contrast to the 
 
62 Id. at 1852. 
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64 JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990). 
65 PERROW, supra note 2. 
66 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE 
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (Univ. of Chi. Press 1996). 
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criminal justice system’s approach.  The standard review of a “wrong man” 
conviction exposed by DNA has been a laconic narrative along the lines of: 
“The witness picked the wrong guy; we believed him; the jury believed him 
too.”67  For example, the Innocence Project posts on its website this account 
of the Massachusetts case of Denis Maher: 
On November 16, 1983, a 28-year-old woman was attacked as she was walking home 
from work in Lowell, Massachusetts.  An unknown man accosted her and tried to 
engage her in conversation before forcing her into a nearby yard, where he sexually 
assaulted her.  The following evening, a 23-year-old woman was attacked less than 
one hundred yards away from the site of the first assault. 
The second victim had been on her way home from work when she was pushed to the 
ground by a man wielding a knife.  She was able to escape her assailant after a 
vehement struggle and notified the police.  The victim described her attacker as a man 
wearing a red, hooded sweatshirt and a khaki military-style jacket. 
Dennis Maher was stopped and questioned by police on the night of the second attack.  
He was wearing a red, hooded sweatshirt and a subsequent search of his vehicle 
turned up an army field jacket, a military issue knife, and a rain slicker.  Maher, then a 
sergeant in the United States Army, was arrested and charged with the two attacks, as 
well as an unsolved rape that occurred the previous summer in Ayer, Massachusetts. 
Though their descriptions varied, all three victims identified Maher in photographic 
lineups.68 
Contemporary reviews of “wrong patient” events are very different from 
these “wrong man” criminal justice wrongful conviction narratives. 
In an article reviewing the infliction of an invasive procedure on the 
wrong patient for Annals of Internal Medicine, Dr. Mark Chassin and Dr. 
Elise Becher examined a situation in which at least two bad apples were 
certainly available: a nurse had mistakenly brought the wrong patient, and 
an attending physician had failed to introduce himself to the patient at the 
beginning of the procedure.69  But in reviewing the situation, Chassin and 
Becher followed Leape and Berwick and explicitly invoked the lessons of 
the human error studies.70  In essence, they applied the approach of the 
interdisciplinary National Transportation Safety Board Go Teams71 that 
respond to air disasters: 
 
67 On the generally uninformative nature of wrongful conviction accounts, see Gross et 
al., supra note 4, at 533-41. 
68 INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/205.php (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2009). 
69 Mark R. Chassin & Elise C. Becher, The Wrong Patient, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
829-31 (2002). 
70 Id. 
71 The National Transportation Safety Board dispatches a “Go Team” under the 
command of an investigator-in-charge to the scene of all accidents.  In aviation, the team 
will include specialists in operations, structures, power plants, systems, air traffic control, 
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[T]his event shares many characteristics with other well-known and exhaustively 
researched calamities, such as the Challenger disaster, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor 
explosion, and the Bhopal chemical factory catastrophe.  These events have been 
termed “organizational accidents” by psychologist and accident expert James Reason 
because they happen to complex, modern organizations, not to individuals.  No single 
individual error is sufficiently grave to cause an organizational accident.  The errors of 
many individuals (“active errors”) converge and interact with system weaknesses 
(“latent conditions”), increasing the likelihood that individual errors will do harm.72 
Using this perspective, Chassin and Becher reviewed the wrong patient 
episode, and discovered, reported, and analyzed at least seventeen distinct 
errors.  For example, the patient’s face was draped so that the attending 
physicians could not see it; a resident left the lab assuming the attending 
had ordered the invasive procedure without telling him; conflicting charts 
were overlooked; contradictory patient stickers were ignored.  But the 
crucial point for Chassin and Becher was that no single one of the seventeen 
errors they catalogued could have caused the adverse event by itself.73 
Their analysis disclosed not only mistakes by individual doctors and 
nurses, but abiding latent problems.  Communications among the hospital 
staff members were terrible: “Physicians failed to communicate with 
nurses, attendings failed to communicate with residents and fellows, staff 
from one unit failed to communicate with those from others, and no one 
listened carefully to the patient.”74  A patchwork of information mini-
systems that did not speak to each other characterized the hospital; teams 
failed to function, and no one was surprised or bothered when the teams did 
fail to function because of “a culture of low expectations.”75  There were 
gaps on charts, contradictions in conduct, and no legible entry in the charts 
explaining why the patient was in the hospital in the first place, but “[t]he 
culture of low expectations led [practitioners] to conclude that these red 
flags signified not unusual, worrisome harbingers but rather mundane 
repetitions of the poor communication to which they had become inured.”76  
Deviations from accepted practice had become “normal,” and, as a result, a 
disaster occurred.77 
The wrong patient review captured the fact that while every accident is 
unique, each depends in part on latent, abiding features that can encourage 
other accidents in the future.  It indicated that the lessons of Chernobyl and 
 
weather, and human performance.  Examples of the reports compiled and issued by these 
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72 Chassin & Becher, supra note 69, at 829. 
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the Challenger could be applied to health care.  It also indicated that 
although there is less complex technology implicated in delivering medicine 
to the wrong patient than in launching a doomed space shuttle, it does not 
follow—human beings being as various and extraordinary as they are—that 
there is less complexity in a human-dominated system.  Nor does it follow 
that the human system’s complexity must be synonymous with permanent 
incomprehensible chaos.  The wrong patient analysis uncovered things that 
could be changed. 
IV.  HARMFUL, HARMLESS, AND HELPFUL ERROR 
The legal system, habituated to its tradition of dividing errors between 
harmful errors that threaten the reliability of verdicts and harmless errors 
that do not, has generally overlooked the potential of helpful errors.  The 
contemporary criminal justice system lacks a routine for identifying and 
analyzing its unspectacular errors and a template for reporting their lessons. 
When an eyewitness misidentification results in a “wrong man” 
conviction, an examination of the event from a perspective similar to the 
wrong patient review would reveal an organizational accident, which is 
constructed out of a constellation of individual errors and latent conditions.  
We would see that most wrongful convictions are caused, as Diane 
Vaughan said of the Challenger tragedy, by “a mistake embedded in the 
banalities of organizational life.”78 
This sort of examination does not happen often.  Boston Police 
Commissioner Edward F. Davis, who as a Lowell detective investigated the 
cases against Denis Maher, provides a more characteristic specimen of 
current reactions to complex malfunctions.  When asked recently whether 
he owed Maher an apology for the years he had spent in prison, Davis 
replied, “No, because I didn’t do anything wrong.”79  Although Davis 
stressed that he did “feel terrible that this system did not work for [Maher],” 
in the absence of a bad apple, fatalism had taken over.80  In Davis’s 
formulation, “this system” becomes a synonym for “God’s will.” 
Although advocates for the system-variable perspective on eyewitness 
identifications avoid the bad apple mindset, they substitute a focus on 
isolated frailties in investigative techniques and do not examine the 
confluent, cascading failures in any individual case.  The double-blind, 
sequential procedure may be a good thing, but the wrongful conviction of 
Denis Maher required much more than the use of sub-optimal eyewitness 
 
78 VAUGHAN, supra note 66, at xiv. 
79 Chassin & Becher, supra note 69, at 829-30. 
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procedures.  Maher’s wrongful conviction was an “organizational accident.”  
How did it happen?  Was there exculpatory physical evidence on the Denis 
Maher crime scenes that was not collected?  Was that a training, 
supervision, or resource issue?  All three?  Did the first responders 
adequately communicate the full descriptions to the detectives?  Were the 
eyewitnesses’ memories protected from contamination?  At the scenes?  In 
their interviews?  Was any of this documented for later use?  Were 
contaminations dictated by training gaps, or simple facility shortages?  
Were the witnesses aware of each other’s accounts?  Was there a protocol 
for handling multiple eyewitnesses?  How were the discrepancies in 
descriptions overlooked?  Was “tunnel vision” an issue?81  Was “production 
pressure” (caseload levels and clearance rate evaluations) a contributor?82  
Was there training in place to prevent tunnel vision?  Did the prosecutors 
adequately challenge the police on alternative suspects?  What allowed the 
actual perpetrator to escape?  Did the defense investigation serve its 
purpose?  Why not?  Was it a performance issue?  A training issue?  A 
funding issue?  A discovery issue?  Did the trial process provide a clear 
picture of events?  Were the jurors adequately instructed on the nature of 
memory evidence?  Did small failures interact in unexpected and disastrous 
ways?83 
Who was responsible for the Denis Maher wrongful conviction?  
Everyone was involved, to one degree or another.  The Maher conviction 
was an organizational accident: the police followed the witnesses, who 
chose the wrong man, but the redundancies of the trial and appellate 
systems also failed to prevent the initial mistake from taking effect.84 
It is not that this sort of review has never been suggested or performed 
in criminal justice systems.85  For example, Peter Neufeld and Barry 
Scheck, the co-founders of the Innocence Project, began to argue in the 
earliest days of the DNA exonerations that a review function modeled on 
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the National Transportation Safety Board was needed.  As an example, they 
noted that the government of Ontario investigated the events leading to the 
wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin.86  That study fills two volumes, 
and the executive summary is forty pages long.  It dissects the impacts of 
forensic scientists, jailhouse informers, and tunnel vision.  Canada now 
produces intensive reviews of all known wrongful convictions.  Other 
reviews of comparable depth have been produced from time to time in the 
aftermath of public scandals growing out of wrongful convictions.  There 
has been high-quality investigative journalism that has attempted to wrestle 
with systemic failures87 and book-length examinations of individual 
exonerees’ experiences.88 
But these reviews were seen as heroic efforts to face up to 
extraordinary situations and to set a reform agenda.  To some extent, this 
can be explained by the historical context.  The DNA exonerations provided 
the first inarguable proofs of miscarriages of justice.  Activists, appalled by 
the findings, tried to provoke action as quickly as possible.  As a result, 
although reasonably detailed case studies are sometimes compiled, the first 
generation exoneration case accounts were distilled to identify one or two 
“causes” in each case, a prerequisite to prioritizing the “most frequent 
causes.”89 
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Once law reform is chosen as the goal, it exerts a pull toward problems 
that law reform might effectively address and narratives that have some 
utility in the legislative advocacy process.90  The end product is a collection 
of case features that correlate with wrongful conviction rather than a close 
analysis of the causes, active and latent, of specific events.  The medical 
reformers would understand the energy that went into these efforts because 
similar efforts dot the history of medicine from the time of Ernest Codman.  
But they would also see this approach as futile, or even worse, as 
perpetuating a pattern of staying one catastrophe behind.  As Lucien Leape 
wrote: 
Efficient, routine identification of errors needs to be part of hospital practice, as does 
routine investigation of all errors that cause injuries.  The emphasis is on “routine.”  
Only when errors are accepted as an inevitable, although manageable, part of 
everyday practice will it be possible for hospital personnel to shift from a punitive to a 
creative frame of mind that seeks out and identifies the underlying system failures.91 
Contemporary medicine treats errors as “sentinel events”: important 
opportunities to illuminate hidden flaws. 
The practice of criminal justice produces sentinel events on a daily 
basis.  Wrongful convictions, after all, are not the only examples of error in 
criminal justice.  To begin with, every wrongful conviction is also a 
wrongful acquittal because an actual rapist or killer goes free.  Other errors 
can lead to the same result: loss or contamination of evidence, failures to 
follow legal rules that result in suppression of evidence, and in all of these 
examples the perpetrator goes free.  Why?  A misdemeanor defendant was 
detained pretrial and forgotten until six months beyond the expiration of his 
maximum sentence.92  How did that happen?  A dangerous inmate was 
released after “wrapping up” his sentence, but he should have been held 
because three new warrants and detainers should have been lodged.93  When 
he then kills two innocent people,94 was the cause a bad apple’s negligence 
or a system failure?  And how should we treat a domestic homicide when 
the troubled family was on the system’s screen, but no effective 
intervention occurred?95  Where was the mistake when a cooperating 
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witness is killed after his name and whereabouts are leaked before trial?96  
All of these errors might teach us something about latent conditions that are 
“accidents waiting to happen.” 
The reservoir of helpful errors is expanded if we recognize that we can 
learn—and probably learn more and better—by paying careful attention to 
“near misses” that were caught (this time) by special alertness or good luck. 
If Denis Maher’s case were to arise today, it would follow the same 
course—up to a point.  An eyewitness would identify the suspect and 
biological evidence would be collected.  In all likelihood, if Maher were to 
be arrested today, he would still have been the primary suspect at the 
beginning of the investigation.  But when the DNA lab would release its 
report (generally a matter of weeks, sometimes months), Maher would be 
exonerated. 
Today’s Maher case, in other words, would be a “near miss” from 
which we might learn many lessons: lessons useful in future sexual assault 
cases, but also useful in cases in which there would be no DNA safety net 
(such as robbery).97  Police likely would damage their pursuit of the right 
man by mistakenly focusing on the wrong man while waiting for the lab 
results.  Many lessons could be learned from this damage.  Why did they 
have to wait so long for the lab results?  Was the exclusive focus on Maher 
too early?  Too exclusive?  Did someone decide to deluge the lab with 
property crime evidence?  Who?  Was the lab short-staffed, or were the 
staff poorly trained?  Did the defense lawyer sit on an alibi that could have 
been shared?  Why?  Would a quicker, cheaper, preliminary analysis, 
designed to rule out innocent suspects rather than to generate evidence for 
trial have eliminated Maher earlier and put investigators back on the right 
trail sooner? 
It is not unreasonable for a front-line detective like Edward Davis to 
bridle when he is asked to “take the fall” for a wrongful conviction such as 
Maher’s; front-line practitioners are painfully vulnerable to officious 
second-guessing.  As Charles Perrow points out: 
[V]irtually every system we will examine places “operator error” high on its list of 
causal factors—generally about 60 to 80 percent of accidents are attributed to this 
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factor.  But if, as we shall see time and again, the operator is confronted by 
unexpected and usually mysterious interactions between failures, saying that he 
should have zigged instead of zagged is possible only after the fact.  Before the 
accident no one could know what was going on and what should have been done.98 
But the way out of that trap is not a wistful shrug; it is an assessment of the 
role played by conditions latent in the system and the mechanisms by which 
they take effect.99 
The recognition that wrongful convictions—among other criminal 
justice errors—are complex organizational accidents can focus attention on 
the barriers that hamper the front-line troops who are usually singled out for 
bad apple treatment.  Accidents are caused not only by the active errors of 
people at the sharp end of the system—pilots, operators, and doctors; 
eyewitnesses, cops, lawyers, and jurors—but also by the mistakes of people 
far from the scene—managers, designers, accountants, legislators, policy-
makers, funders, and appellate courts.100 
V.  THE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR HELPFUL ERRORS 
The criminal justice system needs a workable facility to collect and 
disseminate detailed, reliable, factual accounts of helpful errors.  Aviation 
has found regular vehicles for communicating the facts of its disasters and 
near-misses through NTSB investigations, the internet, and Flying 
magazine.  Medicine has done the same through journals such as Lancet 
and Annals of Internal Medicine.  The Innocence Project has supported an 
improvised error-tracking function as an appendage to its casework 
operations for many years.  Criminal justice journals could easily provide 
an analogous clearinghouse for the voluntary reporting of errors and the 
sharing of lessons distilled from those errors. 
But if you build it, will they come?  Of course there will be 
jurisdictions and agencies that will decline an error review opportunity.  
Some will never participate; others will only participate in scattered 
instances.  With this reality in mind, Scheck and Neufeld have argued that 
innocence commissions armed with coercive powers (including subpoena 
power) would be indispensable.101  But there is no reason to forestall 
voluntary efforts while awaiting the arrival of a mandatory innocence 
commission with subpoena power.  There is no guarantee that the 
legislative action necessary to create such bodies will be forthcoming any 
 
98 PERROW, supra note 2, at 9. 
99 See Garrett, supra note 46, at 395-400 (discussing the increasing “systemization” of 
criminal processes). 
100 See generally Douglas McCarthy & David Blumenthal, Stories from the Sharp End: 
Case Studies in Safety Improvement, 84 MILBANK Q. 165 (2006). 
101 Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 11. 
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time soon.  Even if versions of such bodies are created, it is not clear that 
they will be either individually useful or generally compatible since they 
will be the products of uncoordinated and partisan state legislative 
processes.  Besides, industrial and medical quality experts would argue that 
the more the process appears to its nervous participants to be a voluntary 
professional inquiry rather than a blame-oriented inquisition, the better the 
analyses and educational products are likely to be.  Faced with an end-of-
process coercive inquisition, the players generally devote energy to trying 
to game the inquisition that could be better spent on trying to understand the 
incident’s complexities and ambiguities. 
Routine error reporting will be very difficult to impose from the 
outside on the criminal justice system’s practitioners.102  The system’s rank 
and file have been taught throughout their careers that silence on these 
matters is usually the safest policy.  They are a resourceful group; they have 
seen the frank admission of error used to burn colleagues, and they have 
developed many tactics and strategies for avoiding comment on 
imperfections.  Any movement in the direction of systematic attention to 
error will initially provoke calls to “let sleeping dogs lie” or, failing that, to 
“keep this in house.”  Even very careful practitioners will be tempted to say 
that tomorrow will inevitably bring new cases and we will just have to try 
harder tomorrow. 
Despite this reflexive skittishness, collecting evidence to fuel self-
criticism is not alien to contemporary law enforcement.  Many police 
leaders value evidence of sub-optimal performance (such as Commissioner 
William Bratton’s well-known advocacy of the COMPSTAT103 program) 
and use error data to amend practice in self-consciously designed “teaching 
departments” and “learning organizations.”104  Police leaders on the cutting 
 
102 In medicine, where accreditation bodies wield enormous leverage, this is not the case.  
Mandatory reporting—at least of harmful errors—is not uncommon, although the consensus 
is that under-reporting persists.  TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 55, at 8-10.  In criminal 
justice there has been a movement toward accreditation of individual component agencies 
(police or corrections departments, or crime labs), but no suggestion that accreditation of a 
jurisdiction’s system, as system, should or could be attempted.  That is not to say that it 
would be a bad idea, and the steps suggested in this Article might prepare the ground for 
such an effort.  The National Institute of Medicine recommended mandatory reporting of 
harmful errors and the creation of vehicles guaranteeing confidentiality to encourage the 
reporting of errors that did not result in harm to patients.  Id.  Something of the kind is not 
out of the question in criminal justice, but it would seem appropriate to allow a period of 
experimentation before imposing it on a broad scale. 
103 WILLIAM BRATTON, TURNAROUND 233-40 (1998).  See generally JON M. SHANE, 
WHAT EVERY CHIEF EXECUTIVE SHOULD KNOW: USING DATA TO MEASURE POLICE 
PERFORMANCE (2007). 
104 See, e.g., William A. Geller, Suppose We Were Really Serious About Police 
Departments Becoming “Learning Organizations”?, 234 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 2 (1997). 
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edge are convinced that robust feedback loops—operating in as close to real 
time as possible—are essential to progress.  Line cops understand and 
accept that, every time they fire their guns, the decision will be reviewed.  
Although prosecutors are generally less involved in day-to-day tracking of 
performance, in the jurisdictions where the Green Book spurred reforms, 
prosecutors always consented to (and frequently led) the reform efforts.  
The reasonable expectation is that police, prosecutors, defenders, and 
judges, although they—like doctors, hospital administrators, risk managers, 
and health insurance executives—see error through various lenses, all share 
a desire to stamp it out and will take steps to analyze it when a framework 
for doing so is presented to them. 
The practitioners themselves are the best gatekeepers for the process, 
and many of their worries can be answered by formally assigning them the 
gatekeeper’s responsibilities.  Manageable limits could be placed on the 
number of errors under study—excluding errors that threaten to waste time 
and effort—by requiring authorized professional practitioners to certify an 
event as salient when they nominate it for study and report.  The process of 
collecting and reporting errors has no chance of succeeding if it appears to 
be an end in itself or—even worse—a suicidal effort to fuel 
uncomprehending outsider attacks. 
The practitioners’ first requirement for participating in the process will 
be: “Don’t waste our time.”  There are incidents—a shooting accident on 
the police target range, for example—where the “keep it in house” strategy 
works perfectly well,105 and those incidents are unlikely candidates for 
clearinghouse participation.  The “all-stakeholders” approach will offer no 
advantage over the traditional approach in those cases, and those cases can 
be quickly discarded. 
What will be included for examination will be as important to winning 
practitioners’ assent to the process as what will be off-limits.  Every 
stakeholder group should be assured that it is licensed to nominate any error 
it considers worthy of all-stakeholder analysis and dissemination.  The 
prosecutor who was left holding the bag in the courtroom should have the 
opportunity to suggest an “organizational accident” review of police and lab 
procedures;106 the crime lab director, vulnerable to scapegoating, should 
have access to the same forum.  The defense lawyer who uncovered the 
alternative suspect who turned out to be the perpetrator, or the alibi that was 
ignored, could nominate for study the question of how the system was 
 
105 See Michael T. Charles, Accidental Shooting: An Analysis, 8 J. CONTINGENCIES & 
CRISIS MGMT. 151 (2000). 
106 See Sylvia Moreno, New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
2007, at A4. 
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misled until its final phase.  The trial judge, presented with a mess at the 
terminal point in the process, could ask that a study group be convened to 
explain how that situation was created.  Victims’ services professionals 
could call attention to instances of mishandling of victims’ safety issues.  
No one would have a veto, but without a consensus there would be little 
value in reviewing the nominated error, and the process could be 
terminated.  By definition, a process proceeding without broad participation 
would be a waste of time in any event.  The only price for embarking on the 
process would be an agreement to see it to its end: to follow the facts of an 
individual event wherever they lead, while still retaining autonomy 
regarding any more general recommendations or reforms that might be 
suggested by whatever facts are found. 
Front-line participants will quickly lose patience with any review that 
applies rarefied national standards without considering local resource 
problems, legal constraints, and institutional histories.  Obviously, most 
errors are local, and the study of those errors will require a fine-grained 
knowledge of local systems, practices, and challenges.107  Practitioners may 
be happy to share the lessons of their findings with others, but their first 
priority will be to learn something practical about the frailties in their own 
environments and to repair them. 
If these locally focused analyses are pursued according to a national 
protocol, reported within a uniform national template, and recorded in a 
national clearinghouse, the accuracy and the teaching power of local 
findings can be enhanced by way of national access to these error reports.  
If the review function supports a modest cadre of national or regional 
experts (as does the NTSB Go Teams model), the presence of a few outside 
representatives on a local error review team could provide process 
consistency across local reviews and supplementary subject-matter 
expertise which might be unavailable to local practitioners.  Practitioners 
will not feel that they have been wasting their time if they know that they 
are being saved from reinventing a wheel that has been invented and tested 
in other jurisdictions.  At the same time, a neutral outsider with a national 
or regional perspective might help insure against another potential waste of 
time by warding off any drift toward an incestuous insiders’ process 
devoted to either mutually protective logrolling or to finger-pointing aimed 
at paying off ancient, local inter-agency grudges. 
 
107 Some events have causes that are so local and idiosyncratic—for example, “Judge 
Doyle was off his medication”—that they can quickly be consigned to the “waste of time” 
bin.  Other events cannot be understood without examining historical and cultural contexts.  
See Vaughan, supra note 82, at 340-45 (describing the need to study cultural and historical 
factors affecting organizational accidents). 
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The second demand of criminal justice leaders will be: “Don’t 
embarrass my people.”  Practitioner leaders will not commit professional 
suicide or casually sacrifice subordinates to a learning-from-error process.  
Even so, because they will recognize that the particularly humiliating 
harmful errors—the apparent scandals that any agency would most like to 
keep “in house”—are the errors least likely to stay in house, they will 
accept a measure of discomfort as the price of participation.  Since the 
spectacular disasters are likely to be exposed, an examination by a sober 
professional panel is an attractive substitute for the pillory of “gotcha” 
journalism, the accusatorial atmosphere of a grand jury, an internal affairs 
proceeding, a grandstanding plaintiff’s lawyer in a civil law suit, or a 
finger-pointing competition among the implicated agencies.  At worst, a 
careful, dry—even boring—professional review of an error would be a 
useful non-blaming supplement to the accusatory brickbats of journalists 
and perennial adversaries. 
The extra effort that clearinghouse participation will require from 
practitioners is justified for cases of organizational accidents that have roots 
in more than one agency or individual performance and cannot be 
scrutinized within any single “house.”108  Police commissioners who send 
mistaken officer-involved shootings only to internal affairs know that they 
will be accused of whitewash.  The prosecutors who volunteer an in-house 
investigation and then discover a problem with the police force know that 
they will be accused of passing the buck which will simultaneously 
jeopardize an ongoing working relationship. 
In these situations, an organizational accident review, while it will not 
eliminate the potential for embarrassment, will at least ensure that 
embarrassment is not gratuitous and that it is appropriately modulated and 
shared.  Regularizing error review within a formal clearinghouse program 
can actually enhance protections against the personal humiliation of 
individual staff members.  Complete peer review confidentiality for 
reports—a feature once advocated (at least for errors that did not harm 
patients) by the National Institute of Medicine109—may be out of reach.  
But measures to limit access to professional colleagues and to exclude 
 
108 Cf. Berwick, supra note 42, at 55 (noting the necessity for cross-department 
interactions). 
109 TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 55, at 8-10.  Embarrassment will remain an inhibiting 
factor even though most criminal justice actors enjoy a broad immunity from tort liability 
that medical personnel can only gaze at in wonder.  See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering 
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU. L. REV. 53; see also Van de Kamp v. 
Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from 
suit over failure to train regarding documentation and constitutionally required disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence).  This grant of the benefits of immunity from tort liability could be 
conditioned on paying the price of cooperation with post-error analysis investigations. 
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casual sightseers are still possible because the formality of the process will 
allow for the identification of cases in which confidentiality does not 
conflict with other values.  Moreover, drafting standards can offer some 
measure of anonymity—for example, “the ranking official on the scene” 
(rather than “Captain Shane”).110  When a report’s audience is not restricted, 
the investigators can supply context that minimizes the subjects’ 
embarrassment without adversely affecting the utility of the report.  Agency 
heads or elected officials who submit to NTSB-style investigations can 
fight on favorable grounds by saying, “let’s wait for the report.”  Once a 
known error puts a public reputation for infallibility out of reach, the public 
perception that a fallible agency honestly faced and rectified its failure can 
become a crucial bulwark of the agency’s stature and the system’s 
legitimacy.111 
Slightly different considerations apply when the learning-from-error 
inquiry is extended to near-miss events.  In aviation, a pilot who promptly 
reports a near miss is immunized; the event is studied confidentially, and its 
lessons are disseminated.  In medicine, the Joint Commission, which 
accredits hospitals, maintains a registry of “sentinel events” including not 
only incidents of injury, but also of high risk of injury.  The criminal justice 
near miss generates grim sighs of relief, but little incentive for instigating 
an analysis. 
Of course, the creation of a “safe harbor” for near-miss criminal justice 
events will not be a matter of simply turning a switch.  Inertia, self-
protective bureaucratic reflexes, and the unfamiliarity of the effort will all 
present challenges.  But the aviation and medicine experiences indicate that 
it will not be an impossible task either.112 
In many ways the near miss presents the criminal justice practitioners 
with a tempting target.  Simple proximity in time to the events to be 
investigated enriches near-miss investigations.  Documents will be easier to 
find, participants will be easier to interview; a full, reliable record is much 
easier to construct than in the review of a thirty-year-old wrongful 
conviction.  Because the events examined are more recent, the lessons they 
teach will be more useful.  Time will not be wasted in dissecting procedures 
and technologies that have been out of use for twenty years. 
 
110 This is the practice followed in NTSB post-crash reports.  See Chassin & Becher, 
supra note 69. 
111 Conley, supra note 13 (noting an elected district attorney’s views on the need for 
remedial measures). 
112 There are approximately five thousand aviation near misses reported annually.  The 
FAA Aviation Safety Action Program is described at http://www.faa.gov/about/ 
initiatives/asap/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
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Cases where something went right can shed important light on cases 
where everything went wrong.  Typically, a near miss provokes a lower 
level of defensiveness among the operators.  There is a sense in which a 
near miss is a success story.  Since the near miss caused no lasting harm, 
there should be fewer worries that an error report will trigger financial 
liability, harm a reputation, or cheat the victim out of compensation if it 
affords confidentiality to the operators.  The inhibiting effect of activists 
exploiting the “myth of innocence,”113 whom law enforcement veterans see 
as sanctimonious second-guessers, will be muted. 
A coherent program of learning from error that includes the evaluation 
of near misses offers its rewards both within local systems and across 
scattered systems.  The radical fragmentation of the criminal justice system 
in the United States into a myriad of federal, state, and local systems cannot 
be eliminated; there will never be a United States version of Britain’s Home 
Office.  But a common national template for error review, enacted locally 
and informed and challenged by diverse local experiences, can substantially 
mitigate the problem.  Reading of a distant system’s experience of 
completed accidents can alert currently isolated practitioners to the 
operation of dangerous latent features that are present in their own local 
systems.  Reading studies of remote near misses can reveal both those 
dangerous latent features and potential fail-safe devices or procedures that 
are not present locally.  It can counteract the endemic tendency of today’s 
best practice standards, designed to provide a minimum floor for 
performance, to calcify into a ceiling that blocks further improvements.114  
A compact national clearinghouse dedicated to providing technical and 
process support to the local study of criminal justice error through a small 
cadre of experts and veteran practitioners could conveniently be housed 
under the National Institute of Justice115 or funded (at least initially) with 
non-profit resources. 
 
113 See generally Marquis, supra note 8. 
114 Cf. Berwick, supra note 42, at 56. 
115 The National Academy of Science’s recent suggestion of the formation of a new 
National Institute of Forensic Science, if adopted, would also provide a highly suitable home 
for an error clearinghouse.  COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., 
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 20-22 (2009).  The National Institute of Justice, having convened many “technical 
working groups” to deal with specific areas of “best practice,” might now consider 
convening another to develop core “best practices” for a consistent error-review process.  
The course followed by the medical reformers (begin with the development of small 
“communities of insight,” follow that phase with a broad nationally representative 
conference, and then fund a series of national “demonstration projects”) would seem readily 
adapted to criminal justice reform.  See generally KENNEY, supra note 3. 
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If the only impact of the circulation of the organizational accident 
reports is to provide practitioners in all roles with the regular opportunity to 
ask, “Could this have happened to us?” the process will have value.  Even 
so, everyone in the criminal system has plenty of work to do already, and 
the question remains whether the organizational accident model of error 
review will generate positive change, beyond the circulation of damage 
reports, that repays the investment of effort. 
The experience of medicine and aviation demonstrates that the broad 
participation that organizational accident reporting requires will produce its 
own benefits, distinct from value of the content of any reports, and 
potentially more important, too.  The practice of generating organizational 
error analysis can place local criminal justice systems on the threshold of a 
fundamental cultural change.  Working at organizational accident analysis 
can steer the criminal justice system toward the ideal of continuous quality 
improvement and fulfill the preconditions for the inception of the “culture 
of safety” in criminal justice that medical reformers have made giant strides 
toward adopting. 
VI.  TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE TEACHING HOSPITALS 
When a rash of highly publicized reports of medical errors and patient 
deaths (analogous to the sudden tide of DNA exonerations let loose in the 
Green Book) alarmed the health care community in the 1990s, there was an 
obvious place to “do reform”: the traditional teaching hospital.116  The 
medical quality reformers had more success in hospitals than in any other 
arena.117  The structure of a teaching hospital—in which academic 
divisions, research components, clinical departments, specialties, and 
administrative support units are forced to interact—could respond fairly 
quickly to physician-reformers. 
These reformers advocated that hospitals mobilize the findings of 
“human factors” researchers like James Reason.  Reason argued that errors 
are inevitable in human performance, and that the best path toward reliable 
performance in complex organizations is the creation of a “culture of 
safety.”118  According to Reason, a culture of safety: (1) is informed about 
current knowledge in its fields; (2) promotes the reporting of errors and 
near misses; (3) creates an atmosphere of trust in which people are 
encouraged to report safety-related information; (4) remains flexible in 
 
116 KENNEY, supra note 3, at 55-59. 
117 David Blumenthal & Charles M. Kilo, A Report Card on Continuous Quality 
Improvement, 76 MILBANK Q. 640-42 (1998) (describing the mixed record of, and structural 
barriers to, continuous quality improvement efforts). 
118 See generally JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 
(1997). 
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adapting to changing demands (by, for example, shifting from steeply 
hierarchical modes into “flatter” team-oriented professional structures); and 
(5) is willing and able to learn about and adjust the functioning of its safety 
systems.119  Reformers challenged practitioners to establish a culture of 
safety in medicine by adopting the ideal of “continuous quality 
improvement,” which was advocated by industrial expert W. Edwards 
Deming120 and was central to the post-World War II revival of Japanese 
industrial corporations.  In a movement that followed Deming’s principles 
(captured in To Err Is Human: Building a Quality Health Care System and 
Crossing the Quality Chasm),121 the reformers advocated continuous quality 
improvement rather than end-of-process inspection as an organizing 
principle. 
Donald Berwick challenged the health care system to save one hundred 
thousand patients’ lives in eighteen months by applying six simple, 
evidence-based practices.122  These practices had been derived from a 
process employing Deming’s approach to learning from the organizational 
accident perspective on error, involving every member of the teams charged 
with a patient’s care.  For example, a janitor in a Pennsylvania hospital’s 
intensive care unit discovered the cause of a mysterious outbreak of central 
line infections when he reported that “ambu bags” carrying plentiful 
bacteria were often left lying uncollected in the ICU.123  Berwick’s Institute 
for Health Improvement enrolled 3,000 hospitals in the effort and saved 
over 120,000 patients’ lives, surpassing its goal.124  The effort to 
continuously identify errors and work in inclusive teams built a culture of 
safety that, in turn, had nourished the ideal of continuous quality 
improvement.  As two leading medical commentators noted, “[a] 
 
119 Id.; see also McCarthy & Blumenthal, supra note 100, at 167. 
120 See generally W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS (1982).  On the medical 
reformers’ adoption of Deming, see KENNEY, supra note 3, at 27-36; Berwick, supra note 
42; Paul Batalden, Organization Wide Quality Improvement in Healthcare, in THE 
TEXTBOOK OF TOTAL QUALITY IN HEALTHCARE 60, 60 (A.F. Al-Assaf & June A. Schmele 
eds., 1993). 
121 TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 46; INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A 
NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001). 
122 The six measures were: deploying rapid response teams at the first sign of patient 
declines, delivering evidence-based care (including aspirin) to heart attack patients, 
developing accurate lists of patient medications, preventing intravenous line infections (by, 
for example, hand-washing), preventing surgical site infections with three steps (including 
pre-surgery administration of antibiotics), and preventing pneumonia in intensive care units 
with simple measures (such as elevating the head of beds to thirty degrees).  Liz Kowalczyk, 
Nonprofit Launches Plan to Reduce Medical Errors, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 2004, at A1. 
123 KENNEY, supra note 3, at 121-25. 
124 Id. at 270-72. 
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paradoxical insight is that the adoption of specific improvements both 
furthers—and is furthered by—organization-wide cultural change.”125 
There are no bricks-and-mortar teaching hospitals in criminal justice 
that would house the system’s full range of practitioners—first responders, 
police, prosecutors, scientists, policy-makers, corrections officials, defense 
lawyers, and judges—but bricks and mortar are the simple part of the 
problem.  Operating rooms and patient beds are not needed here, only 
meeting rooms.  The judiciary usually has a wealth of square footage at its 
disposal.  Every jurisdiction has a law school or a school of criminal justice 
that can be enlisted to provide a neutral meeting ground, as well as 
substantive faculty expertise and administrative support services. 
The criminal justice system’s fractured structure presents a more 
serious challenge.  Responsibility is divided across many agencies, each 
having a distinct bureaucratic identity, history, and ideology.  Several of 
these agencies are set in explicitly adversarial relationships.  A great deal of 
the criminal practitioners’ work (especially the legal practitioners’) is spent 
in a zero-sum atmosphere dominated by the question: “Who wins?”126 
Still, it is possible to identify a potential durable web of relationships 
and activities in criminal justice that might fill the teaching hospital’s role.  
In fact, something like a “virtual teaching hospital” may already exist, in 
embryo, in the criminal justice system.  The “wrong man” reform 
controversies provide a lens through which this latent structure can be seen. 
Relative to traditional lineups, the double-blind, sequential 
identification technique yields fewer “false positives”—identifications of 
known innocents—but it also yields more “false negatives”—failures to 
identify the perpetrator when the perpetrator is present in the lineup.127  
Arguments now rage over whether the traditional or double-blind, 
sequential method of lineup administration is “better.” 
In criminal justice discourse this question is usually answered 
according to pre-existing feelings about Blackstone’s ratio of ten guilty men 
escaping being better than one innocent man convicted.  But think of a 
lineup or a photo array as a screening test for guilt, and then compare its 
treatment to the reception new proposed screening tests for, say, prostate 
 
125 McCarthy & Blumenthal, supra note 100, at 196. 
126 See generally John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of 
the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1972) (describing an endemic “battle model” 
ideology of criminal process). 
127 As Gary Wells himself acknowledges, “[t]his pattern of results is a classic trade-off in 
which reducing the rate of one type of error, mistaken identifications, can increase the rate of 
another type of error, failure to identify the culprit.”  Jennifer Emily, Photo Lineup Study Is 
on Deck: Method in which Witness Sees Pictures One at a Time to Be Considered, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 1, 2009, at 1A. 
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cancer or breast cancer would receive in the teaching hospital.  In a modern 
hospital, the proposed innovation will be evaluated with the same system-
consciousness that characterizes organizational accident reviews of medical 
error.  Propose a new screening test in a hospital setting and the inquiry will 
begin with how the rest of the system might absorb this new “system 
variable.”  The discussion will include the researchers who had developed 
the new test, along with the clinicians who must use it on the patient floors, 
the administrators in the office wing who are bound to consider the price, 
and the risk managers who must weigh the costs and benefits of using it.  
With any luck, there will be someone from the cancer survivors’ 
community to represent the patients’ viewpoint.  Too many false positives 
might mean one thing for prostate cancer, where surgical treatment results 
in impotence and incontinence, and where the cancer is often a slow-
growing one that many men die with, but do not die of.128  Too many false 
negatives might mean something quite different for breast cancer patients 
where early discovery, effective treatment plans, and prognosis are closely 
related.  Are there redundant tests that might be used?  Can a science-based 
scheme of watchful waiting be developed?  Are there cheaper ways to 
assess the situation? 
In a teaching hospital, no researcher’s novel screening test (that is, no 
new system variable) would be proclaimed “better” than an existing test 
without first carefully assessing how the rest of the system would adjust to 
its adoption or compensate for its rejection.  The new test might be seen as 
an improved part for the system, but everyone would be mindful of Donald 
Berwick’s observation that “optimizing parts is not a good route to system 
excellence.”129  The same should be true in criminal justice.  Which 
identification procedure is better depends to a significant degree on the uses 
to which the balance of the system puts the results.  The higher number of 
false positives generated by traditional lineups may not be a bad thing if the 
rest of the system treats the lineups as a preliminary screening-only test that 
triggers a conscientious campaign to “rule out” the suspect in the medical 
sense of trying carefully to eliminate the suspect’s guilt as a possibility and 
dedicates the time and energy that a “rule out” approach would demand.  
The same higher number of false positives will be a recipe for disaster if the 
system (because of, for example, resource scarcity and caseload pressures) 
 
128 Gina Kolata, Studies Show Prostate Test Saves Few Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2009, at A1.  The eyewitness “false positive” has an additional detrimental consequence: a 
false positive “burns” the witness and will undercut the credibility of any later testimony by 
the mistaken witness (and, less directly, any other witness) if and when someone correctly 
identifies the actual perpetrator. 
129 ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 185 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
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must treat every lineup as a conclusive diagnostic test that in effect screens 
in the defendant and triggers only a hunt for supplementary corroboration 
aimed at courtroom persuasiveness rather than objective investigative fact 
finding. 
Two projects have tested the double-blind, sequential reform’s impact 
on the criminal justice system in the field.  Both projects aimed to test 
potential applications of the lessons learned from eyewitness error, and both 
explored the effect of a new system variable on an existing system.  In other 
words, both attempted to evaluate the impact of a new system variable 
practice in much the same way that a teaching hospital might evaluate a 
new cancer screening test.  But the two projects took radically different 
paths toward the goal they shared. 
The first path was followed by a field test of eyewitness identification 
procedures conducted by the general counsel of the Chicago Police at the 
direction of the Illinois legislature.130  It terminated in a dead end.  The 
Illinois Pilot Program (Pilot Program) began in a crisis atmosphere.  It was 
prompted by a cataclysmic series of highly publicized exonerations in 
Illinois that produced a Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment.  
The Commission recommended the adoption of double-blind, sequential 
lineup practices in the state.  Responding to disquiet about that 
recommendation’s possible effect on existing practice, the Illinois 
legislature mandated that the efficacy of the double-blind, sequential 
method be compared to traditional methods in a field study, “designed to 
elicit information for comparative evaluation purposes, and . . . consistent 
with objective scientific research methodology.”131 
The general counsel for the Chicago Police Department assumed 
responsibility for this study.  Although social scientists were engaged to 
analyze the study’s results, its design and execution were maintained under 
exclusive police control.132  The general counsel (who was not trained in 
social science) devised a program of field tests, selected two other 
municipalities to participate in the program, chose which techniques would 
be employed in which jurisdictions, instructed the officers involved, 
compiled the data, and announced the study’s findings.  The results were 
 
130 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-10 (2006); see also SHERI MECKLENBURG, ILL. STATE 
POLICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT 
PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2006), available at 
www.chicagopolice.org/IL%20Pilot%20on%20Eyewitness%20ID.pdf (describing the 
process). 
131 Id. 
132 Roy S. Malpass, Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind 
Identification Procedures, 11 PUB. INT. L. REP. 5 (2006). 
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widely publicized.133  According to the initial press accounts, “[t]he study, 
the first to do a real-life comparison of the old and new methods, found that 
the new lineups made witnesses less likely to choose anyone.  When they 
did pick a suspect, they were more likely to choose an innocent person.”134  
This assessment of the Pilot Program fueled a counter-attack against the 
gathering momentum of the double-blind, sequential reform initiatives 
advocated by Gary Wells and his allies.135 
But an evaluation of the study by a “blue ribbon” group of social 
scientists (with no prior involvement in “wrong man” issues) concluded that 
the Pilot Program proved nothing at all.136  According to the group, the Pilot 
Program changed two variables—blind/not blind and 
simultaneous/sequential—at the same time, which created a “confound” 
with “devastating consequences for assessing the real-world 
implications . . . [and] guaranteed that most outcomes would be difficult or 
impossible to interpret.”137  Other critics complained that the Pilot Program, 
because it made no effort to employ random assignment, violated first 
principles of the scientific method and was doomed to worthlessness before 
it began.138  Interpretation was further hindered by the Chicago Police 
Department’s determination that much of the data would be withheld as 
confidential (varying from scientific conventions).139  The vigor with which 
the Chicago Police Department seized on and publicized their conclusory 
findings, and the eagerness with which other opponents of Gary Wells’s 
reforms propagated the Illinois results provoked a backlash from Wells’s 
allies.  Some of the Illinois data needed explaining: for example, in two of 
the three jurisdictions, fillers were identified in none of the traditional 
lineups.140  One defense lawyer pointed out that the Illinois study, because it 
 
133 Kate Zernike, Study Fuels Debate over Police Lineups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at 
A1. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g., Sheri H. Mecklenburg et al., Eyewitness Identification: What Chiefs Need to 
Know Now, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2008, at 68. 
136 Daniel L. Schacter, et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the 
Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2007). 
137 Id. at 4. 
138 Timothy O’Toole, What’s the Matter with Illinois?  How an Opportunity Was 
Squandered to Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 
CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 18, 20. 
139 This issue is, as of the date of publication, the subject of a lawsuit initiated by the 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and brought pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act.  The defense bar had not previously been involved in developing the Pilot 
Program.  Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers v. Chi. Police Dep’t, No. 1-08-2073 (Ill. App. 
Ct. filed 2008). 
140 “Filler” identifications in earlier field studies had typically been in the 20% range.  
See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual 
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chose the number of suspect identifications (not perpetrator identifications) 
as its benchmark, created “a huge risk that the benchmark inflate[d] the 
perceived reliability of the most suggestive procedures, rather than the most 
accurate ones.”141  In this view, the Pilot Program perversely showed that 
when police were not “blind” (and therefore were free to steer witnesses), 
fillers were never chosen, but that when the police were prevented from 
steering, a more realistic rate of “filler hits” accrued.  In other words, they 
argued that the Pilot Program proved that bad apple detectives were the 
problem. 
The merits of the Illinois Pilot Program are not the issue here.  The 
point is that, regardless of its merits, the Pilot Program’s method of 
addressing eyewitness exonerations generated considerably more heat than 
light.  The only thing everyone agreed on is that it should be done 
differently next time.142  Future programs conducted along the lines of the 
Pilot Program would be seen as both a waste of time and an embarrassment 
by its objects. 
Hennepin County (Minnesota) Attorney Amy Klobuchar also explored 
the effect of double-blind, sequential lineups on the criminal justice system.  
This second path showed that the elements needed for a continuous quality 
improvement approach to criminal justice already existed and were waiting 
to be assembled. 
Mistaken eyewitness identifications had not been seen as a major 
problem in Minnesota,143 and there was no crisis or media firestorm 
brewing.  However, Amy Klobuchar had been monitoring the national 
discussions triggered by the Green Book and the National Institute of 
Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.  In effect, 
Klobuchar exploited the national-to-local arc of a national learning-from-
error feedback loop: she built on the recommendations of Janet Reno’s 
Technical Working Group on Eyewitness Evidence and tested them on the 
streets of her diverse jurisdiction.  The insights of Reno’s heterogeneous 
group of scientists, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and investigators were 
exposed to the front-line operators of Minnesota’s system.144  At the same 
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time, Klobuchar decided to report the Hennepin County results (no matter 
what they showed) to the national criminal justice community—thereby 
closing the loop on the national learning-from-error process. 
In Minnesota, the front-line practitioners were involved in the 
development of the project from the beginning (unlike in Illinois where the 
front-line police were presented with the Pilot Program on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis).  The project required the prosecutor’s leadership to get the 
police involved, but it did not require coercion.  As Klobuchar and her 
coauthors describe the initiative, 
[a]t the outset, police chiefs registered apprehension toward the new [double-blind, 
sequential] protocol primarily because existing lineup procedures were working well.  
Nevertheless, discussions and training sessions sponsored by the Hennepin County 
Attorney’s office convinced the chiefs that the pilot was a worthwhile project . . . .  
Bloomington Police Chief John Laux explained, “In my time since 1968 in law 
enforcement, I’ve always been willing to experiment, to try something new.  I try to 
be open-minded and say just because it’s working doesn’t mean it can’t work 
better.”145 
This was the Deming/Berwick ideal of continuous quality improvement in 
action. 
As the study unfolded, the police acted as full partners in identifying 
and unraveling the operational challenges caused by the conversion from 
the traditional lineups to the double-blind, sequential format.  They were 
aided by Dr. Nancy Steblay, a psychology professor at Minnesota’s 
Augsberg College.  Klobuchar assigned Steblay an active role at every 
stage: designing, monitoring, and evaluating the study.  When problems 
arose, the police consulted Steblay and derived fixes to those problems.  For 
example, the Minneapolis Police, intrigued by the challenge, developed a 
laptop photo array program that met both the prosecutor’s and the 
psychologist’s criteria.146  Specific police concerns about the new 
procedures (for example, potential witness discomfort with the entry of the 
new “blind” officer at the photo array stage) were addressed promptly and 
considered by all of the actors.  As the process unfolded, new empirical 
questions were identified, and new experiments were designed to answer 
those questions.147  The impacts of small adjustments in operational routine 
on witness memory were discussed and taken into account.  The 
 
defense lawyer reaction to the new procedures in their calculations, and although the general 
defense position on eyewitness evidence had been thoroughly ventilated in the post-
Buckhout debates, it can be argued that the Hennepin effort would have been aided by 
soliciting that reaction directly sooner in the process rather than later in court. 
145 Klobuchar et al., supra note 40, at 405. 
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147 Id. at 411. 
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consequences of new, science-based procedures on routine operational tasks 
(for example, officer assignments) were similarly examined.  The 
eyewitness “system” was scrutinized as a system, with science, operational 
expertise, and legal criteria all playing a role in the analysis.  Specialists in 
the street, the lab, and the courtroom met in a conference room to work 
things out.  They developed solutions to the eyewitness error problem 
identified by Klobuchar and also gained insights into other operational 
problems that they originally had not known existed. 
The Hennepin County team emerged with, in Klobuchar’s words, 
“stronger cases, and more justice.”148  They created a genuine, serious, two-
way, ongoing conversation.  They  confirmed that the double-blind, 
sequential photo-array was an improved component for the investigative 
process, but they remembered that “having great components is not 
enough.”149  They provided an example of how the generation of a specific 
improvement instigated by the recognition of error furthers—and is 
furthered by—organization-wide cultural change. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The DNA catalogue of wrongful convictions delivered a shock to the 
system in the world of criminal justice.  The system’s operators, to their 
credit, have responded to the shock with extensive investments of time and 
energy to try to make things right. 
The return on these investments can be compounded if we analyze 
wrongful convictions and other criminal justice errors as “organizational 
accidents”: that is, as complex events in which small mistakes combined 
with each other and with latent conditions hidden in the system to produce 
unexpected tragedies.  A national commitment to fostering the local 
practice of routinely developing NTSB-style factual reports on criminal 
justice organizational accidents will provide a more accurate and more 
useful understanding of the causes and cures of recurrent disasters. 
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Besides, this new orientation can pay dividends that will eclipse the 
impact of the content of any reports it generates.  The practice of 
organizational accident review leads organically, as it did in medicine, to a 
new focus on continuous quality improvement and meets the preconditions 
for the formation of a new “teaching hospital” function in criminal justice. 
The organizational accident approach encourages local leaders to 
jettison the every-agency-for-itself tradition and form teams of diverse 
practitioners representing every role in the system, supplemented by 
relevant specialists.  The existing efforts of practitioners on innocence 
commissions, working groups, and similar vehicles provide strong evidence 
that this can be done.  Despite traditional frictions among police, 
prosecutors, judges, and defenders, veteran practitioners grow up together, 
handle the same cases, deal with the same victims and defendants, and work 
in the same courts.  They have more in common with each other than they 
have in common with anyone else, and, despite their clashing perspectives, 
they all hate criminal justice error.  Disentangling organizational accident 
fact-finding from law reform will minimize any temptation to “game” the 
fact-finding to avoid anticipated law “reforms” and direct participants’ 
energies toward improving their understanding of their daily practice.  This 
initiative does not require participation by blue-ribbon dignitaries (as law 
reform oriented innocence commissions often have); it can—and should—
be carried out at the major and lieutenant colonel level rather than at the 
major general level. 
Working steadily on organizational error analysis creates an increased 
system-consciousness among the practitioners who staff the criminal justice 
system’s components.  Today’s police lieutenants will make better police 
captains next year thanks to their participation in the rigorous 
organizational accident examination of a known error or near miss.  
Assuming that all of the participants behave themselves, mutual trust 
between adversaries can be expected to grow by degrees.  As the 
participants gain from their experiences, the systems they operate will gain 
from their insights.  If their error reports are disseminated through a 
national clearinghouse, distant justice systems can gain too.  A disciplined 
commitment to team analysis of error will lay the foundation in criminal 
justice for realizing the new ideal of continuous quality improvement that is 
transforming medicine. 
The Hennepin County experience with the “wrong man” problem 
provides one small concrete demonstration that such a change is feasible, 
that teams can be readily created, and that these alliances can function as 
effective “teaching hospitals” by bridging the gaps within criminal practice 
and connecting criminal practitioners to scientific experts.  The Hennepin 
example also suggests that with committed leadership from law 
2010] LEARNING FROM ERROR 147 
enforcement, prosecutors, the judiciary, or the bar, these teams can be 
nourished and maintained.  The history of the medical quality movement 
indicates that by treating the error review teams as standing resources, ready 
to be catalyzed by each new local error, we can begin to foster a system-
wide commitment to an ideal of continuous improvement and pursue a 
“culture of safety”  in criminal justice. 
At the beginning of the medical quality movement, Lucien Leape 
observed that: 
Physicians and nurses need to accept the notion that error is an inevitable 
accompaniment of the human condition, even among conscientious professionals with 
high standards.  Errors must be accepted as evidence of systems flaws not character 
flaws.  Until and unless that happens, it is unlikely that substantial progress will be 
made in reducing medical errors.150 
The same is true in the world of criminal justice.  There is no reason to 
avert our eyes from episodes of dishonesty or incompetence when they 
occur—and they do occur—or to eliminate law reform, accreditation, and 
inspection efforts. 
But no inspection at the end of the criminal process, however 
searching, can be sufficient.  Even if we somehow accounted for every 
episode of perjury, laziness, and racism, and refined the formal legal 
standards and procedures to a high level of effectiveness, we would still 
reap a bitter harvest of tragedy that has its roots in everyday human 
mistakes.  Building a culture of safety in criminal justice can begin with a 
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